Municipal Corporations—Public Improvements—Statutory Notice Requisite to Jurisdiction by Jones, William Evan
Montana Law Review
Volume 20
Issue 1 Fall 1958 Article 5
July 1958
Municipal Corporations—Public
Improvements—Statutory Notice Requisite to
Jurisdiction
William Evan Jones
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Legal Shorts is brought to you for free and open access by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Montana
Law Review by an authorized editor of The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law.
Recommended Citation
William Evan Jones, Municipal Corporations—Public Improvements—Statutory Notice Requisite to Jurisdiction, 20 Mont. L. Rev. 114
(1958).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol20/iss1/5
RECENT DECISIONS
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS---PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS--STATUTORY NOTICE
REQUISITE TO JURISDICTION-Defendant city sought to establish a special
improvement district to raise funds necessary for participation with the
state highway department in improving a joint city street-state highway.
A statute required that notice be sent to every property owner in the pro-
posed district.' One of 425 property owners was inadvertently overlooked.
Sixty-nine Kalispell residents obtained a decree enjoining defendant city
from proceeding, and declaring the improvement district void. On appeal
to the Supreme Court of Montana, held, affirmed. Notice by mailing to
each property owner prior to establishment of an improvement district is
a jurisdictional necessity. Wood v. City of Kalispell, 131 Mont. 390, 310
P.2d 1058 (1957).
The statute governing creation of municipal improvement districts ex-
pressly states that before creating such a district the city council must pass
a resolution of intention to that effect; it must then give notice of the pas-
sage of the resolution and of the time when protests will be heard, by pub-
lication and by mailing a copy of the notice on the first day of publication
to every property owner affected.'
Johnston v. City of Hardin! was the first Montana case to spell out
precisely the manner in which the statute is construed. It unequivocally
stated that since the statute defines with particularity the mode in which
municipal authority may be used in this regard, nothing could excuse fail-
ure to strictly observe its mandates.
The majority of American courts have acted similarly and have tended
to construe statutes for the creation of special improvement districts strictly
against the municipal corporation and liberally in favor of affected proper-
ty owners.' These courts generally have placed responsibility for strict
construction on the legislature, indicating that whatever step the legislature
has prescribed cannot be declared by the courts to be merely directory or
immaterial! However the same result is often reached even where the
statute expressly provides for a liberal interpretation.' This would seem to
indicate that the rule is one of judicial creation rather than a reflection of
legislative intent. On the other hand, courts have sometimes recognized that
to permit highly technical construction to override justice would be to work
a wrong.'
The result of this strict construction applied by Montana and the
majority of American courts is to hold that absolute compliance with the
statute is jurisdictional. This view is illustrated by a Michigan case which
states that correct notice is a "condition precedent" to jurisdiction over the
proceedings.' Similar language has consistently appeared in Montana deci-
'REvIsED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 11-2204.
'lbid.
'55 Mont. 574, 179 Pac. 824.
'See 63 C.J.S. Municipal Oorporations § 1297 (1950).
5Merritt v. Portchester, 71 N.Y. 309, 27 Am. Rep. 47 (1877).
"Buck v. Town of Monroe, 85 Wash. 1, 147 Pac. 432 (1915).
7People ex rel. de Frece v. Lathers, 141 App. Div. 16, 125 N.Y. Supp. 753 (1910).
'Auditor General v. Calkins, 136 Mich. 1, 98 N.W. 742 (1904).
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sions, perhaps most specifically in the Johnston case,' where it is stated
that strict statutory compliance is the sine qua non to creation of the im-
provement district." This has the effect, in cases such as the instant one,
of rendering all the proceedings void and requiring that the city begin anew.
Viewed in the light of modern conditions this result seems highly undesir-
able, and raises the question of why the proceedings should be held a nullity
as to property owners who have received the correct notice. At the turn of
the century, a Minnesota court held that the better view in cases such as
this is that the proceeding is void only as to those who have not been noti-
fied, but valid as to those who have had the proper notice.' This seems a
preferable position.
Explanation for the majority rule may be gleaned from a brief ex-
amination of the purposes which have been attributed to statutes' providing
for the creation of municipal improvement districts. As stated by the
Supreme Court of Montana the purpose of serving notice is threefold:'
(1) to apprise the property owner that his property is within
the proposed district and liable to assessment if the district is
finally created;
(2) to inform him of the general character of the contemplated
improvements and the cost of the same, and
(3) to advise him of the time when and the place where he may
be heard.
It should be noted that compliance with due process of law is not the princi-
pal purpose of such statutes. Due process is sufficiently satisfied by news-
paper publication. Rather the paramount consideration seems to be super-
vision of municipal authority.' The additional step of notice by mail is in-
surance that the general character of the proposed improvement will almost
certainly come to the actual knowledge of the property owner. This enables
those whose property may be affected to investigate the type and quality of
materials to be used, the total cost of the project, etc." Thus the underlying
purpose of such statutes would seem to be an effective curb to graft, un-
wise and unnecessary projects, and excessive municipal indebtedness. Of
course, a direct concomitant benefit accrues to the individual property
owner within the proposed district in that his property is not bound with-
out his knowledge. But even where due process is satisfied, if the district
creation statute is not, the improvement district proceedings may be held
void.'
'Note 3 supra.
10The Montana Supreme Court has at times spoken in terms of substantial adher-
ence to the statute, and substantial compliance with the conditions precedent im-
posed by the statute. However, this language when applied to the facts still re-
sulted in strict construction. See Shapard v. City of Missoula, 49 Mont. 269, 141
Pac. 544 (1914) ; Hinzeman v. City of Deer Lodge, 58 Mont. 369, 193 Pac. 395
(1920).
"Hurst v. Town of Martinsburg, 8 Minn. 40, 82 N.W. 1099 (1900).
"Johnston v. City of Hardin, 55 Mont. 574, 580, 179 Pac. 824, 825 (1919).
"Note 4 supra.
"Benshoof v. City of Iowa Falls, 175 Iowa 30, 156 N.W. 898 (1916),
"Ibid.
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The principal case is the first Montana decision to raise the precise
issue of whether jurisdiction attaches over those property owners who have
received the correct notice. Apparently the Court believed that prior Mon-
tana decisions were stare decisis on this point. Conceding this to be true, it
does not alleviate the undesirability of a law which holds a municipal im-
provement district entirely void for improper notice where 424 of 425
property owners have been correctly notified. The additional expense
which must be incurred by the municipality in such a case seems unreason-
able. Perhaps the solution to this problem lies only in legislative amend-
ment of the existing law. If this be so, two specific questions deserve de-
tailed consideration.
First, is personal notice really essential to the effective implementation
of the purposes of the district creation statute? Notice by publication has
long been deemed sufficient to subject real property to adverse judgment
in an in rem proceeding against it.' Service by publication is likewise
sufficient to obtain jurisdiction in certain divorce cases." Should the
social policy of Montana demand any greater notice in the case of crea-
tion of a municipal improvement district than is necessary to divest one
of his property or his spouse?
Second, assuming that personal notification is desirable and necessary,
is there any valid reason why jurisdiction should not attach over those
property owners who have been correctly notified? The purposes of the
statute have been satisfied as to them. Then why require the municipality to
incur the expense of unnecessary repititious notice to those already prop-
erly notified, just to reach one person who was not? It would seem much
more logical to hold the district valid upon proper notification of the
person or persons omitted.
The factual situation in the instant case is extreme, but it serves to
point out the archaic state of Montana law in this regard. In the present
era there is no place for the result of the priniepal case, and it is not
to be excused merely because it is the majority view. Courts have placed
the responsibility for the strict construction given such statutes on the
legislatures, and it appears that the legislatures must bear the responsibility
of effectuating any amendments in these laws. It is submitted that the
instant case stands as an unjustified impediment to social progress and
illustrates the need for legislative revision of Montana's law governing
creation of municipal improvement districts.
WILLIAM EVAN JONES
"Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
"See RvisEu CoDxs OF MNTANA, 1947, § 93-3013.
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